James Yeager

[jmcrawf1]

Me and rockemup talked about it in a PM, its no problem at all, I think we both understand each other better now.

No problem.

 

[JWG223]

Walk softly, and throw your stick away.

Have you written or called your Congressperson; you're on their list?
Are you a veteran; you're on their list?
Are you a member of gun forum; you're on their list?
Have you ordered anything gun related online; you're on their list?
Member of the NRA; you're on their list?
Bought any preparedness supplies; you're on their list?
Bought any food storage supplies online; you're on their list?
Bought any seeds online; you're on their list?
Any association with the Tea Party; you're on their list?
Ordered any conservative books online; you're on their list?

Jimmy Hoffa says to "take the suns a bitches out" from the Tea Party, and that's an example of calm and moderation.
Why wait? Turn your guns in early; beat the rush. God forbid anyone should do what will be against the law.

The difference is kind-of like shooting the crack head while they are standing on the corner to prevent him from one day breaking into your home. It's rather ill advised.

 

[JWG223]

He made an apology video so he is instantly forgiven and his CCW permit re validated. Right??? His apology video should be taken as seriously as his threat video...

I think he is funny. Heck, I think he is a comedian. So, like Jamie Foxx, he gets a pass. Right??? He was just trying to get attention by saying something controversial...

I agree, same with Obama. He doesn't mean to ban guns, he just wants people to "wake up" and be a little more conscious about how they store them, etc. He isn't ACTUALLY trying to ban them, google "hyperbole", right? Just a little controversy. Good for people. He would never flip his lid and ban guns.

But really, Yeager spent over a minute explaining how he "WAS NOT PLAYING".

 

[doc ace]

Can someone post a poll to see if the BS population feels James went too far with the video or it needed to be said? I'd like to see the results!

 

[Leonidas]

I agree, same with Obama. He doesn't mean to ban guns, he just wants people to "wake up" and be a little more conscious about how they store them, etc. He isn't ACTUALLY trying to ban them, google "hyperbole", right? Just a little controversy. Good for people. He would never flip his lid and ban guns..

I used to question your thinking. That's no longer necessary.

 

[Peacemaker]

Wow! Do you really believe this? Its this how you really feel?

I agree, same with Obama. He doesn't mean to ban guns, he just wants people to "wake up" and be a little more conscious about how they store them, etc. He isn't ACTUALLY trying to ban them, google "hyperbole", right? Just a little controversy. Good for people. He would never flip his lid and ban guns.

 

[nickatnite]

But only 1 video. I've read yeager's AAR. He was complacent, careless, and didn't do what he was supposed to. That is in his own report.

After Action Report - James Yeager

BIAP 4.20.2005
The Ambush of Edinburgh Risk and Security Management’s Operation Apollo

AFTER ACTION REPORT

Prepared: April 22nd, 2005 by James Yeager
Job Title: Operator
Rank: None
Contact: JamesYeager@TacticalResponse.com

Opening Statements

This is my After Action Report of the ambush on ERSM’s Operation “Apollo” that occurred on BIAP road in Baghdad Iraq on April 20th, 2005. These are purely my thoughts and do not reflect the thoughts of the other ERSM personnel involved in the attack, ERSM as a corporation, or anyone else. Some of these statements will sting but please note I will be pointing out my own faults and mistakes as well.

Nobody wants to speak ill of the dead. I certainly do not. The unfortunate fact is that some serious mistakes were made before and during the attack and for the good of all Operators these issues have to be uncovered before they can be addressed.

S.O.P.s

I was the only one in the incident that followed our spoken S.O.P. Which is; “Move off the X and get away from the vehicle. Cover for your partner to move. Regroup and set up 360 degree security. Commandeer another vehicle if necessary.” It is obvious that everyone person involved in the incident did something else. As each person tried to implement the plan another person who didn’t slowed them down or halted their progress. While more operators than me wanted to implement the plan the fact that other didn’t complicated the situation and threw a wrench into the works.

Chain of Command

During the incident we did not have any leadership. We did not act as a Team. We functioned like 8 separate people trying to stay alive. Was Johno the mission team leader or medic? As soon as we had wounded he became a medic and we were left without leadership. Coincidentally during our response to the ambush was the exact time we needed leadership. Even if we didn’t have any wounded he would have been ineffective as a leader because he was in utter shock and was whimpering.

Why didn’t somebody see that leadership in crisis coming? Somebody DID see it coming. Scott Traudt pointed out over a month ago that this was an issue. There was a mission plan on the dry erase board and the night before and the night before the move Scott scribbled something like “Team Leader or medic? Machine Gunner or Medic? One guy cannot do both!” He had pointed arrows to Johno’s seating position and Stef’s seating position. The next day at the meeting Johno said if anyone else wrote on the board he would punch them.

I doubt Scott will ever get an apology for his being right (again) or for being threatened.

Training

There is an old saying that goes “You will not rise to the occasion. You will default to your level of training.” That is incorrect. You will ONLY default to the level of training you have mastered. It is easy to see from the chain of events that occurred that we have some seriously under qualified personnel on the project.

Driving - An important skill that has nothing to do with going to the Crossed Swords and ripping tires off cars doing J-turns and bootlegger turns. Just because you have driven a car your whole life doesn’t mean you are qualified as a PSD driver. Has anyone ever really done a J-turn or a bootlegger turn in reality? Not in Baghdad!

Shooting- The guys weren’t using their sights in general. Stef emptied an entire magazine and never used his sights and never killed anyone. Getting rounds off is great but hitting the people shooting at you is better. Which shots are the most important? The first shots are the most important of course. Training should be geared for winning battles not keeping your clothes clean. I have conducted very limited training for our team. I have offered to do much more and have even submitted three full training packages which have all been dismissed because we didn’t have time or ammunition.

Medical – The C.A.S.H. (U.S. Military Hospital) was going to give every one of Apollo’s staff a free “Combat Lifesaver” course. We never made time for it. I guess we were just too busy being hung over.

PSD- This team talks constantly about “diamonds” and “walking formations”. Sure we might look like a PSD team but we are not. So what do we do to get everyone on the same page? We argue about the way we should do it and never decide anything. That is the same approach we have to EVERY tactical situation and you will have that when you have multiple people that know how to do the same task albeit slightly different.

The amount of time it took Chris to say “Ahh…****ing hell! I’m hit man!” (When he was shot through his leg) was plenty of time to bail out of the car. Ducking out instead of worrying about his wound would have prevented his head and throat shots and would have saved his life. Proper training that was recent, relevant, and realistic could have ingrained that skill set. He is dead because we didn’t train enough and that is another failure in our leadership.
Vehicles

As I fired from the rear of the car I knew I should have attempted to drive off. Sitting in traffic waiting for the road block to clear I had put the emergency brake on, shifted to neutral, and picked up my rifle. When the rounds impacted I should have driven away. I should have never put the car in neutral and I should have never activated the emergency brake. I ****ed that up big time.

I was mad at myself for overlooking such an obvious solution. Although no other injuries were sustained by the occupants of my car after the initial attack I will always kick myself in the ass for taking my foot of the clutch. In hindsight driving at the Army, with guys “Hajied up” shooting out the window would have been certain death at any rate. Those Soldiers were on the scene of an attack and I am sure they were on edge. I will still always know that moving the car would have been my best option and I ****ed it up. In saying that I feel automatic transmission equipped cars should be used for PSD for any number of reasons.

Should we be high profile or low profile? Give me a break. We are either high profile or higher profile. We have 6’7” guys with chalky white complexions with a Shemag wrapped around their head. Nobody’s buying it. Some of our guys were the white prayer caps. Guess what? Iraqis PRAY in those not drive. You make yourself a target with it.

In the past our team leaders have said “If something happens (an attack) just take your Haji dress off.” Well everybody has a plan until they get punched in the face and when we got punched our planning went out the window. We had guys dressed like locals firing machine guns a couple hundred yards from the U.S. Military. That should NEVER happen again. I am still amazed we weren’t torn to shreds by those .50 calibers!

I have heard people on the team say “I don’t like armored cars. I want to be able to shoot back.” You cannot shoot back if you are dead. People who say and think things like that have never been in combat. There are two objectives in a gunfight and I will let you decide which one is more important. Your first choice is “Shooting the badguys.” Your second choice is “Not being shot”. Figure it out.

There is no LOGICAL reason to actively avoid using armored vehicles. We had 6-8 armored vehicles at our team house collecting dust as we drove the unarmored cars to BIAP. You don’t think SUVs are safe? Fine, just buy armored sedans. I don’t know what will happen on any given day but I know on April 20th, 2005 that Stef Surette, Chris Ahmelman, and James “Jay” Hunt II would have lived if we were in armored cars. I also know that Ian Harris is alive because he WAS in an armored car that day. Ask him about the bullet impact on the door near his head that the armor stopped.

The terrorists were shooting Armor Piercing rounds at us. Standard level-7 armor will stop 7.62 armor piercing rounds. If the armored car could have moved we could have made better use of it in this incident by blocking the medics, etc. Why is the gas tank, engine, and transmission unarmored on an armored car?

Weapons

When I arrived on this team in October of 2004 I was shocked to see that MP-5s were being carried by half the team when rifle were available. They were carrying these weapons on BIAP runs and every other Red Zone and Green Zone run. I have made hundreds of requests for these guys to carry rifles and M-4s specifically. There is no place for an MP-5 on BIAP runs.

Medical

Are you a Medic or machine gunner? There is no better first aid than to kill the people shooting at you. Mark getting the M-249 back in the fight after it malfunctioned was more important than putting the bandages on Stef. It wasn’t Mark’s call though and he did the best he could. It was a terrible predicament. In hindsight a person might say that isn’t true that getting the gun back in operation was more important than the trauma care. What if the bad guys had not chosen to leave? What if next time they decide to stay until we are all dead? We were fighting against a Com-Bloc GPMG belt fed 7.62x54 PKM. The best medicine is superior firepower. An M-4, let alone a pitiful MP-5, is no match for a belt fed weapon firing a full battle cartridge.

There is no standard medical kit placement. There is no consistent medical kit placement or protocol on our team and many operators have chosen to forgo carrying medical supplies at all. The medics didn’t use the victim’s medical supplies first which is a common SOP for many teams. I don’t know what our S.O.P. for that is because we have never talked about it.

QuickClot and TraumaDEX used correctly might have made a difference to at least Stef and quite possibly Jay as well. I do not know how recent our medics training has been but I think they should have made sure we had the most advanced trauma care available and we didn’t. I am talking about a product that costs less then $20 that MIGHT have saved some lives.

I have my own trauma bag and carry it frequently. It is STUFFED with all kinds of medical gear. You cannot get anything else into it. Our medical bags on-scene hardly had anything in them. Why weren’t they STUFFED with bandages? Our medical preparation is virtually none and it is as if it was set up by people who had no concept of what a real battle might be like.

A medic, or anyone, who’s sole medical training meant that they watched or read BlackHawk Down would have put a better medical plan together than that. How do you run out of trauma dressings with one patient? Inexcusable!

For any of the operators reading this please wear dog tags. As you know many of us do not share much about ourselves like religious affiliations. Our surviving members had to answer a lot of questions about our deceased that we didn’t know the answers. Chris was brand new to the team and I didn’t even know his full name or religious preference.

Communication

If we had a QRF we would need a way to communicate with them. ERSM needs a radio system, a real radio system with quality repeaters and all the things that go with it. With as many teams as they have running they need and English speaking dispatcher in the office as a central point of contact.

I have complained MULTIPLE times about our team’s constant radio chatter about nothing relevant. They call our rally points when all the cars are within 100 yards of each other and NOBODY else can hear us. They call out traffic on overpasses, side streets, on ramps, exit ramps that are not a threat. When I asked why they do it they said “Because we always have.”

I talked on the radio for years as a cop. I guess the novelty wore off. Radio communication is not a toy and in a tactical environment should be used for the legitimate purpose of communicating danger and nothing else. If you want to play buy some tin cans and a string. Using up airtime by telling everything that is NOT dangerous is ineffective and tactically incorrect.

They have continually failed to point out what is relevant and we have had several close calls in the past and I didn’t know about them until our debrief after the run. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. The day we were ambushed nobody told me before, during, or after our car was shot exactly WHO was shooting at us. I hit the ground ready to fight but I didn’t have the info to shoot the correct people. That is a catastrophic break down in communication.

Verbal communication on scene was difficult because of the gunfire ringing our ears as well as the tachy psychia effect that epinephrine has on people that have not trained to an unconscious level of competence. We have been asked not to wear hearing protection and if I had a choice my Peltor Comtacs would be worn under my helmet that I have been asked not to wear as well.
In addition to that the surveillance ear pieces that most everyone is forced to wear fell out. They should never have been used for tactical missions and should be replaced with TCI “Liberator” headsets or equivalent.

Personnel

Stef Surette – Died fighting and that is the most honorable death a person can have in my opinion. He fought hard and his last conscious decision was squeezing his trigger. I am proud of him for his fighting spirit and my only regret is that he chose to discount the Dicker and he did not relay the info on the shooter to me. May he rest in eternal peace.

James Yeager (Me) – I made several tactical errors the biggest being my failure to get the car moving. I ****ed that up and there is no excuse. I am taking a PSD driving course as soon as possible. I also feel I should have been moving in to cover vehicle three and Johno as he worked on Jay sooner. I was still trying to carry out our SOP and I got to thinking in that line instead of realizing sooner that we had bogged down and my tactics should change accordingly. If Johno had proper security set up could he have worked on Jay sooner/faster? I dropped the ball.

Mark Collen – Did an outstanding job medically treating Stef and a great job overall as well. He got into the fight quickly and helped his fallen comrade. He kept cool under pressure and gave others direction (cover, deploy smoke, etc). He fought fiercely until his M-249 malfunctioned then he wasted no time grabbing an M-4 and getting back into the fight. Outstanding!

Simon Merry – Simon told me later jokingly that the incident had “popped his cherry”. I think he did a great job under the circumstances and I am sure he will do even better in the future. That was a hell of a way to get your cherry popped! Great job!

Ian Harris – There should have been a plan in place for Ian to assume command of the team in a situation like this. Ian is a fighter and a leader. He just didn’t know it was his turn to step up. He should have never been put into that position. He communicated with Mark and covered him as needed. Awesome!

Chris Ahmelman – Same mistake as me. He should have gotten car three moving. Moving or bailing out of the car would have saved his life. May he rest in peace.

Johno – He is unfit for command, unfit as an operator, unfit as a tactical team leader, and one day might be a good medic if he learns to keep his head under pressure and gets some training. He has no business being in a combat zone.

Jay Hunt – Never had a chance. He died a Warrior’s death. Calm and collected up until his last breath. May he rest in peace.

Closing Thoughts

SOME teams within ERSM actively seek out the Warriors within and gets rid of them. I do not feel this is a corporate policy but rather the policy of the Project Managers with low self esteem issues. Warriors are a rough bunch. All the “Type A” personalities clash and there are frequent arguments. They are sarcastic and caustic many times. Their strong personalities make lesser men who lead them feel inadequate and they feel threatened. Put them under pressure and you get a diamond.

Team Apollo has lost more and more Warriors as the mission continues. Sometimes a team leader like Johno lies and says a Warrior has mental issues to get them fired like Jose Matos or we lose them from poor moral like because we have terrible leadership in general like Pat Esquibel or Richard Smith. Or a team leader like Ben Kingston picks a fight with them and then asks them to resign like Jeremy Jordan. No matter how it happens it is wrong. I wouldn’t trade ten thousand sheep in a firefight for one single Warrior like any one of those guys.

Security companies have to plead with clients to be used correctly because nobody needs a PSD team until they are attacked. On the same token a PSD team doesn’t need Warriors until IT is attacked. In both cases they think the other is a nuisance and more trouble than they are worth until the moment of truth and by then it is far too late.

Hiring sheep instead of men who will fight the fight might be great for the 364 days a year you have nothing going on but you will pay dearly for it on day number 365.

I am deeply troubled by the events that have occurred on Operation Apollo before, during, and after this incident. It is my intention, no matter how painful; to allow all parties involved, at all levels, a chance to see from my perspective at the bottom of the totem pole what life is like day-to-day on this project.

I have been threatened, bullied, insulted, and belittled for my Incident Report. I certainly hope this trend does not continue so that this team can learn from these mistakes before one more mission goes badly. I not only have no place in our command structure I was given my 30-day notice before this incident happened. I am NOT responsible for this event or anyone’s actions but my own. I freely admit I made serious tactical errors and I am taking steps to correct them as soon as possible. Getting mad at me because this even happened and I reported it as I saw it is ridiculous.

Egos need to be set aside and the validity of my statements weighed out for the good of this team and the good of the company.

Respectfully Submitted,

James Yeager

 

[nickatnite]

After Action Report - ERSM's "Sanitized" Version

This is ERSM's self proclaimed "Sanitized" version:

EDINBURGH RISK AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT
AFTER ACTION REVIEW
OPERATION APOLLO CONTACT BIAP ROAD 20 APRIL 2005

BACKGROUND

On 20 April 2005 Edinburgh Risk personnel assigned to Operation APOLLO (support to the Independent Election Commission of Iraq) were engaged by enemy forces on Route IRISH (BIAP Road) during the execution of their duties.
Post incident Edinburgh Risk, in keeping with company policy and operational SOP’s, conducted a full deliberate review conducted by an external assessor of the incident along with corresponding verbal and written AAR’s. The assessor for this review was the Group’s USA Managing Director. He has extensive operational experience in the military and as a civilian contactor/ operator. Having spent August 2003 to December 2004 in Baghdad, he is well familiar with the specific challenges posed by the insurgency in Iraq.
This report is the only official Edinburgh Risk report in regards to the incident.

AIM

The overall aim of this report is to identify friendly and enemy action during the contact in order to extract lessons identified that may be applicable to current and future operations.

INCIDENT

Phase 1 - Pre-mission orders: Prior to the move, during the evening Order’s Group 19 April 05, a warning order was issued to members of the APOLLO team who would be conducting a road move to BIAP in order to pick up operators coming in from rotation. Instructions were issued in accordance with a standard military warning order with additional discussion conducted in regards to the teams SOP for dealing with the VBIED/IED threat on Route IRISH. In order to mitigate the threat of IED/VBIED attack the team was in the process of instituting a number of SOP’S in regards to the use of new operational methods to help mitigate the threat. The team reviewed video footage taken of Route IRISH during previous moves in order to identify choke points, danger areas and likely areas of enemy attack. The team was also concerned with blue on blue incidents and stressed the need to be prepared to identify themselves as required so as to avoid blue on blue with Coalition or other PSC’s operating on Route IRISH.

Phase Two- Mission Orders: On the morning of 20 April 05 the team task organized for the days move and met to conduct an Operations Group. The O Group was conducted utilizing the standard 5 paragraph Op Order format. All operators were present for the
order. The detail leader, AJ, conducted the O group utilizing video footage, again, to identify danger areas and to brief the team’s scheme of maneuver during the movement. Alternatively SM and SS briefed with the drivers in regards to the route and actions on when approaching danger areas, coalition or other PSC call signs. Orders were conducted from 1100 hours to 1130 hours. At approximately 1130 hours the team mustered for their final inspections and departed for BIAP.

Phase Three- Movement: The team was task organized as follows:

Lead/Advance Vehicle consisting of Soft Skin BMW Sedan
Driver - JY
Vehicle IC - SS
Rear Gunner (medic) - MC

Center/Main Body B6 Armored Mercedes
Driver- SM
Vehicle IC- IH (mission 2 IC)

Rear/Follow Vehicle consisting of Soft Skin BMW Sedan
Driver - CA
Vehicle IC – AJ (overall mission commander)
Rear Gunner - JH

The team departed through Gate 12 at approximately 1140 after linking in with the Ops Room where they dropped off their route and mission card with Edinburgh Risk Ops. The team also contacted the ROC to check on the status of Route IRISH and the ROC informed them that the route was open.

Team movement was going according to plan until the team reached RV 5. RV 5 was assigned as the last foot bridge/flyover heading west just prior to the checkpoint leading into BIAP/VICTORY.

As the team reached RV5, traffic was coming to a halt and the team was halted just beneath or just outside of RV5 with the main body vehicle coming to a halt just beneath the foot bridge. The team was halted at approximately 1155 hrs.

Traffic to the front was halted due to Coalition Forces closing the road in response to an incident on the road. The team estimates that Coalition Forces were located 300-400 meters to the front of their position while halted at RV 5.

During the halt the team reports that there were approximately 10 local national vehicles to their front which cleared the area by either driving back down towards traffic and utilizing a slip road to leave the area or by crossing the median and traveling down the alternate lane of travel.

AJ called for the team to move forward in order to create depth between the motorcade and local national vehicles to the rear as well as to take them out from under the foot bridge/fly over which was deemed to be a threat as it presented a danger area due to the possibility of attack from above.

The motorcade moved forward approximately 300 meters giving the rear gunner, JH, in the rear vehicle enough clearance to cover the foot bridge with fire if required whilst also allowing the team to cover and close the slip road located to the right front of the motorcade so as to prevent enemy attack from that location.

At this time the three vehicles are spaced at approximately 100 meters between vehicles with the motorcade occupying an area estimated to be 300-400 meters in length from the front vehicle to the rear vehicle.

During the halt AJ and IH discuss crossing the median in order to leave an area where they feel they are exposed. The decision is made not to cross the median as they are concerned that the vehicles will not clear the obstacle presented by the median.

While the team was halted MC identified a suspect vehicle along the slip road to the right flank, north, of the motorcade at a distance of approximately 500 meters. He took the vehicle under surveillance utilizing a scope mounted upon his M4. He observed one local national male in the vehicle and noted that the vehicle occupant was not paying the call sign any attention and seemed to be concentrating his attention on local national traffic halted to the suspect vehicles front. He assessed that the suspect vehicle was not a threat and informed the team accordingly.

The team remained static for approximately ten minutes while it waited to see if Coalition Forces would open the road. At approximately 1200-1210 AJ made the decision to abandon the position and was in the process of ordering the team to move when the team came under intense automatic weapons fire.

Phase Four- Contact: As stated at approximately 1210 hrs, the APOLLO team was engaged with heavy automatic weapons fire which originated from north of their position along the slip road bordering Route IRISH. All three vehicles sustained damage and casualties during the initial burst of gun fire. It is assessed that the team was engaged by two or more PKM belt fed GPMG firing armor piercing ammunition. The armored sedan suffered hits which would have normally defeated standard ball ammunition. During the initial burst of gun fire the APOLLO team suffered three casualties which consisted of JH, CA, and SS. Two of the operators JH and SS were wounded in the hip/groin area and suffered sever trauma to the femoral artery while CA was shot in the hip and head with the head wound killing him outright.

Upon the initiation of contact the lead vehicle driven by JY attempted to drive out of the kill zone and was unsuccessful as he had taken the car out of drive placing it in neutral and setting the emergency hand brake which prevented him from driving out of the kill zone during the opening stages of the contact. Upon failing to drive *off the X* JY, MC and SS evacuated the vehicle. SS at this point was already wounded and was located beside the vehicle in the prone though he was attempting to remain in the fight. JY fell to the rear of the vehicle in order to return fire and engage enemy forces. According to JY he could not identify enemy forces and thus he attempted to suppress the general vicinity of where he suspected enemy fire was coming from. After having fired an estimated half a magazine of ammunition out of his M4 JY broke contact from the rear of his vehicle and maneuvered to the median to the south of the engagement area. MC also positioned at the rear of the vehicle identified enemy forces firing from a white suburban vehicle and engaged the white suburban with approximately 100 rounds of 5.56 from his M249 Minimi. He then experienced a stoppage and switched to his M4 with which he continued to engage the enemy forces located within the white suburban. The white suburban drove out of sight and at that point MC provided immediate medical care to SS.

Concurrently vehicle two, the armored sedan attempted to first maneuver to its front in order to provide cover to vehicle one. SM, driver of vehicle two, reported that the car was unresponsive as it had suffered damage during the initial burst of GPMG fire which caused catastrophic damage to the transmission. IH, IC of vehicle two, exited the vehicle as the vehicle was under heavy fire. He then maneuvered to the front bonnet of vehicle one so as to provide suppressive fire in support of the team. IH was able to identify enemy forces located within the white suburban and fired semi-automatic, well aimed fire into the rear of the vehicle. He reported that his fire seemed to be *bouncing off* the rear of the vehicle and, upon interviewing other team members who took the suburban under fire, they believe that the suburban was armored as their fire had little or no effect on the enemy vehicle. IH came under severe enemy fire whilst he attempted to suppress enemy forces but he continued the attempt to win the firefight. After attempting to move the vehicle forward in support of vehicle one SM attempted to move the vehicle to the rear to provide cover for vehicle three but again, the vehicle was unresponsive. SM then exited the vehicle and positioned himself to the rear of the vehicle in order to provide covering fire to vehicle three. SM in accordance with team SOP’S deployed a smoke grenade to the north of the motorcade in order to mask the callsign.

Vehicle three occupied by AJ, CA, and JH was engaged as well during the initial burst of GPMG fire with CA, the driver, being killed - thus the vehicle remained static. JH who was hit in the initial burst attempted to evacuate the vehicle and take enemy forces under fire but was almost immediately out of the fight due to the nature of his wounds. AJ the vehicle IC evacuated the vehicle in order to try and treat JH and CA. He moved JH to a position of cover behind the left front tire of the vehicle and then moved to treat CA who was by then deceased. He then returned to treat JH who was hit in the femoral artery.

The initial contact lasted 32 seconds in accordance with the video footage taken from a dash mounted camera in vehicle three. Within that 32 seconds three operators were combat ineffective due to enemy fire and related wounds and all three vehicles were disabled either through mechanical failure and/or driver errors and wounds. All three vehicles were taken under fire almost simultaneously which leads to the belief that there was more than one enemy element engaging the motorcade though only one enemy element was ever identified by the members of the team. The volume of enemy fire and the consistency and accuracy of that fire in relation to a callsign that was spread out over three hundred meters indicates either a very proficient enemy operator or the presence of more than one GPMG during the contact.
Enemy forces engaged the motorcade for no more than one minute and ten seconds at which point they had evacuated the engagement area.

Upon disengagement with enemy forces the team consolidated its position with MC and AJ continuing to provide medical treatment to JH and SS while the rest of the team provided 360 degree security.

Phase Five- Consolidation: SM signaled to Coalition Forces who were located three hundred meters to their front (west of the contact area) who responded to the signals by approaching the engagement area slowly with three Humvees. Concurrently JY left his position at the median and moved to vehicle three in order to provide close in support and security to AJ who was still attempting to treat JH. While, at the rear of vehicle three, JY engaged a local national vehicle that was attempting to move into the engagement area from the east on Route IRISH. Believing this to be a possible VBIED, JY fired two shots into the vehicle at which point the vehicle stopped and did not attempt to move any closer into the engagement area.

At this point Coalition Forces had reached vehicle one with IH providing them an immediate sit-rep as to the situation while asking for Coalition Forces support in order to evacuate the casualties. Coalition Forces took command of the scene and instructed IH to police up team members, equipment and vehicles that were mobile and evacuate the scene. They instructed the team to move to Camp VICTORY where they would evacuate the wounded team members to the Camp VICTORY Aid Station.

IH rallied the surviving team members and loaded into vehicle’s one, two and three. Vehicle two was un-serviceable and thus abandoned. AJ stayed with Coalition Forces and was still treating JH along with an army medic at this point. AJ was hit in the buttocks during the engagement but continued to remain behind in order to insure that Coalition Forces treated and evacuated the wounded/dead. IH evacuated the team with vehicles one and three departing for the CASH at Camp VICTORY.

During the consolidation and preparation for evacuation a call sign from Olive Security approached the motorcade from the east on Route IRISH arriving at vehicle three and interfaced with AJ and JY. Olive offered assistance to the team and, due to the fact that Coalition Forces had run out of room within their FLA, Olive evacuated the body of CA along with some team equipment. Olive proceeded to Camp VICTORY meeting Edinburgh Risk call signs at the check point leading into BIAP/VICTORY and instructed the team to follow them into VICTORY as they had the body and equipment with them. AJ had been loaded onto the Coalition Forces FLA and moved to the CASH at VICTORY via the CF FLA. Olive remained with the APOLLO team at the CASH and continued their support. At the CASH, CA and JH were pronounced dead and SS was undergoing treatment during which he died. AJ continued to stay with the casualties until
he was ordered by the military to receive treatment. The remaining team members consolidated all equipment and personnel and returned to Edinburgh Risk HQ located within the International Zone. Support was provided to the remaining members of the call sign for this move by Edinburgh Risk’s Operation Hermes and continued support from Olive.

SUMMARY

Given the nature of the contact, the violence of action executed by a capable enemy force and the volume of enemy fire levied upon the team during the initiation of the contact, the team responded as well as could be expected under the circumstances. Without doubt, this was a highly capable and well rehearsed group of insurgents initiating a deliberate ambush.

Retrospectively, the team should not have remained static for a protracted period of time in a canalized area such as Route IRISH. It is understandable that the team tried to create depth between themselves and local national traffic due to the threat of VBIED on the BIAP road. Inadvertently, this maneuver also resulted in the team unmasking from the concealment provided by low profile saloon vehicles within the main body of local traffic. During the debrief the team acknowledged the fact that they were static in one location for too long a time however they also state that they were in the process of leaving the area when enemy contact was initiated – it is possible that the enemy deliberately waited for this moment to initiate the contact.

Actions during the contact itself were conducted in accordance with the team SOP. The team attempted to drive out of the kill zone but this action was precluded due to operator error for vehicle one and mechanical failure due to enemy fire with vehicles two and three. Upon failing to extract by vehicle the operators evacuated the vehicles and established a base of fire in order to suppress enemy forces so as to then be able to break contact as required. The fact that the team suffered 50 percent casualties in the initial volley of fire detracted from their ability to sufficiently suppress the enemy thus also negating their ability to then break contact. JY in accordance with the team SOP attempted to break contact in the opening stages of the contact yet fire superiority and or suppression had at that time not been established. IH and MC, each under heavy enemy fire, were the only two individuals during the contact who attempted to suppress enemy forces. SM was continuing to try to maneuver his vehicle to a position of support to vehicle one and then two whilst AJ was busily treating multiple casualties at his location with vehicle three. JY was in a location at the median where he could not engage enemy forces as he did no have a line of fire from his location. IH as team 2 IC provided leadership to the team through the use of verbal commands and fire control while the team leader, AJ attended to the wounded personnel from his vehicle. IH, with assistance from Coalition Forces and Olive Security, consolidated the team and evacuated the area.

LESSONS IDENTIFIED

Many of the lessons identified are well known but it is worth reiterating them:
• If forced to go static on Route IRISH (or any route for that matter) teams need to act in accordance with SOP and immediately evacuate the area.
• If enemy forces initiate fire it is imperative that the team under fire first establish fire superiority prior to breaking contact. It is imperative that team members who have eyes on the enemy call out fire direction, distance and description so as to alert other team members to the enemy location. You can not maneuver until you have established an aggressive base of fire.
• Team Leaders should have no additional duties other than that of team leader.
• Crew Served Weapons must be kept running during the course of the fight. If one goes down due to a wounded or killed operator then that weapon must be immediately put back into action by another team member.
• Every move needs to include at a minimum one weapons system utilizing 7.62 NATO in order to defeat enemy forces employing hard and soft skin vehicles.

CONCLUSION

PSCs have experienced countless attacks on Route IRISH as well as on other MSRs within Iraq. PSCs, while having the ability to defend themselves and their clients to a degree, will only be as successful as the conditions established by Coalition and Iraqi security forces. The fact that enemy forces can mass and execute operations in the vicinity of Route IRISH as well as throughout Iraq is a testament to the current conditions within Iraq. PSCs, in order to operate successfully, must swim in a sea of security established by *green army*. If general security is not established by Coalition and Local National security forces to a degree that precludes the enemy’s ability to operate in strength across Iraq then PSC’S and their clients will continue to become a collateral target of an insurgency that operates with impunity.

Signed on Original
Christopher Farina
Managing Director
Edinburgh Risk and Security Management
ERSM-USA LLC
Reston, Virginia

 

[nickatnite]

Report - After the Ambush, James Yeager

BIAP 4.20.2005
The Ambush of Edinburgh Risk and Security Management’s Operation Apollo

Prepared: April 22nd, 2005 by James Yeager
Job Title: Operator
Rank: None
Contact: JamesYeager@TacticalResponse.com


Orders were at 1100hrs Baghdad local time (+9 CST) on April 20th, 2005. We had our typical set of orders covering the aspects of the trip. We have heard them so many times we can all most likely recite them while asleep. Team leaders Al *Johno* Johnson and Stef Surette gave the mission briefing. We were going to Baghdad International Airport (aka BIAP) to pick up two ERSM employees, one of which was an Operation Apollo team member.

Vehicle One: Black unarmored BMW manual transmission
Driver: James Yeager, Primary weapon Bushmaster semi-auto AR-15 with 11.5* barrel
Vehicle Commander and Medic: Stef Surette, Primary weapon 7* barrel full auto AR
Rear Gunner and Medic: Mark Collen, Primary FN M-249 secondary Bushmaster M-4

Vehicle Two: Black armored Mercedes automatic transmission
Driver: Simon Merry, Primary MP-5 secondary Bushmaster M-4
Vehicle Commander: Ian Harris Primary Bushmaster M-4

Vehicle Three: White unarmored BMW automatic transmission
Driver: Chris Ahmelman MP-5 and M-4
Mission Commander and lead medic: Al Johnson Mission Commander, MP-5 and M-4
Rear Gunner: James Hunt II, Primary RPK, Secondary FN M-249, and Tertiary an M-4

All carried Glock model 19s as a sidearm.

We followed our written S.O.P. in relation to dress which is a locally procured ankle length shirt (also known as a *man dress*) that had been cut off at the waist to make me look like an Iraqi while seated in a car. Everyone wore something like that and/or a Shemag (the *rags* locals wear on their heads that gets them the *rag head* moniker).

The mission began at approximately 1125hrs. We departed the Green Zone (also known as the International Zone) like we do every time. The short trip flowed smoothly until we were within approximately ½ mile of the relative safety of Camp Victory and BIAP.

We got stopped in traffic at Rally Point #4 which is the final overpass between BIAP and the Green Zone. The U.S. Army had stopped traffic because they were at the scene of an I.E.D. (Improvised Explosives Device) that had severely damaged a Sport Utility Vehicle. *BIAP Road* is a divided highway with a median strip. It is also a limited access road like an American Interstate which uses entry and exit ramps for access. There was an impromptu stop sign in the middle of our two lane road and orange cones letting traffic know to stay well back.

There was also 2-3 Humvees with at least one of them pointing a .50 caliber heavy machine gun, which I knew would go through an armored car, in our direction to make sure no vehicles got close. Since we had made a conscious decision to drive cars that looked like the locals and dress like the locals I hesitated to get closer than 200-300 yards. There have been more incidents of the Military shooting at PSDs than terrorists which is completely understandable because as a group we tend to drive aggressively, try to blend in with local vehicles, dress like locals and carry weapons often times in plain view if not sticking out of the windows.

I had moved my rifle from the console to my lap when we stopped. Our cars were about 25 yards apart. I watched my *Area of Responsibility*. As the driver of vehicle one I had to watch from my seat’s 12 o’clock counter clockwise around to 8 o’clock. Jay Hunt, who was the rear gunner in vehicle three, had the largest area to watch from the vehicle’s 9 o’clock around to the 3 o’clock.

While we sat in traffic our Team Leader (One I.C.) and lead Medic *Johno* fired multiple bursts from his MP-5 submachine gun from vehicle three. He got outside the car to do it at least once. My estimation is 3-4 bursts of 3-4 rounds each. He did this to *warn them off* (cars) in the rear because they were getting too close. Johno’s area of responsibility was not the rear. The rear was Jay’s responsibility. Johno was neglecting his 12 o’clock to 3 o’clock position. Each time he fired his weapon he was drawing unwanted attention our way and not watching his side of the car. His side of the car is the one in which our attack came from minutes later.

After his second burst I removed my *Haji dress* because there was nothing between those U.S. Army .50 caliber heavy machine guns and us and I didn’t want them to look down the road at the gunfire and see all of us wearing local clothing to include Shemags and engage us. Besides my fear of being shot by the U.S. Military, after Johno began shooting, I assumed the cars near us knew we were Contractors anyway. Our *cover* if we ever had one was now non-existent.

After being directly under the overpass for several moments (maybe 10) we pulled forward about 100 meters to where the final on-ramp to BIAP Road entered. I pulled my number one vehicle far right, as instructed by my team leader Stef, to block traffic from coming onto the roadway. After about 10-15 minutes I took the car out of gear and pulled on the emergency break because my calf was beginning to ache. I would end up regretting that decision.

To our right was a *frontage* road or *slip* road about 75-100 yards out that ran parallel to BIAP Road. There were houses just on the other side of that road. After a few moments one of the guys (I think commander of vehicle two: Ian Harris) spotted a small white sedan on the slip road. He asked that someone look at it with binoculars. We didn’t have any but Mark had a telescopic sight on his rifle. He stated it was parked and the sole occupant was talking on the phone, wasn’t paying attention to us, and wasn’t a threat. I said aloud *He is a ****ing Dicker.* (Dicker is what the Brits call a *lookout*.) My car commander Stef, who heard me, never acknowledged.

About three to five minutes after we saw the Dicker (approximately 1350 hrs) I heard another volley of fire and I thought to myself *What the **** is Johno shooting at NOW?!* I felt rounds hitting the car and I heard the distinctive supersonic crack of a round pass through our car, inches in front of my face, from right to left missing Stef and I. Stef yelled *I’m hit!* and he began emptying a 30 round mag out his window.

I need to mention at this point that both of the other guys in my car saw a large white SUV with black tinted windows rolling slowly down the frontage road heading the same direction we were pointing. They apparently drove a short distance and whipped into an intersection, did a u-turn, and stopped momentarily pointing their vehicle in our direction. This event took several minutes. Mark later said that the passenger window was down in the SUV but he could not see inside and he kept looking in other directions because he didn’t consider the vehicle to be a threat. There were two other people with the area of responsibility in which the attack came from in vehicles two and three and NOBODY reported ANYTHING.

After I went through my O.O.D.A. Loop (please search Google for OODA Loop and Col. John Boyd for more info) I punched the gas to the floor and the engine raced but the car wouldn’t move. I thought it had it been knocked out of commission. After what seemed like an eternity, but was a couple of seconds, I grabbed the door handle and began implementation of our ambush S.O.P. for a disabled car in which the first step is getting out of the car. I remembered I was in a stick shift that was in neutral with the emergency brake on as I hit the ground, and the point of no return, and moved to the rear wheel. I not sure how long it takes to empty a 30 round magazine on full auto but I began firing before Stef emptied his gun the first time.

As I shot from the rear of the car I wanted to kill the terrorists but nobody had told me the direction (I figured that one out on my own), description, or distance. I fired because I have been trained to fire when someone is shooting at me. If I couldn’t make hits I was sure going to make noise. Half the distance to the slip road there were some Hesco barriers and dirt was flying off the top of them. I thought maybe Stef had seen someone behind them and was shooting at them. I now realize it was merely rounds from our team being shot without using the sights. At the time I didn’t know and because there were houses directly beyond that it was the safest place for me to shoot. I shot about 6-10 aimed rounds into the barriers utilizing my EOTech weapon sight.

I felt Mark coming out of the rear door so I began the next phase of our S.O.P. which is getting away from the car (getting off the *X*) because people tend to shoot at cars and rifles easily penetrate them. I turned and ran toward the median which was about 40 feet to the edge. I got face down on the edge of the asphalt, took a firing position, and yelled *MOVE!* to Mark.

I am sure Mark had trouble hearing me as he fired the M-249 across the back of vehicle one. I pulled my rifle to my cheek, looked through my EOTech again, scanned the roof tops and almost shot some clothes hanging off a TV antenna to dry. Nobody was there. I scanned the windows of the houses. I KNEW I heard a PKM and I KNEW the PKM was hitting us well and was most likely in a static position. I scanned the Hescos again. Nothing. *Where the **** is it?* I wondered as I searched. I began aiming between the windows of the houses and shooting the solid brick walls. Although I didn’t know who I needed to kill I knew they were that direction *somewhere*. I felt useless but I thought I might be able to keep their heads down. Mark’s 249 went down (broken or bent belt) and I fired while he grabbed his M-4.

*****!* I thought to myself. I had forgotten to deploy a smoke grenade. When Mark resumed firing I ripped it out of the pouch, peeled off the 100mph tape, put the spoon in the palm of my hand, straightened the ends of the pin out, and pulled the ring. I kept thinking about my Instructor course for and teaching the proper deployment of flashbangs, smoke, and CS. My mind was racing. I forced myself to focus. I wanted to obscure Mark and Stef and so I heaved the high concentration smoke as hard as I could and managed to get it on the far side of their car.

While this was happening I heard sporadic outgoing gunfire from cars two and three, I wasn’t sure which vehicles but I was glad to hear them shooting because I knew they were alive. I was hoping that cars two and three were communicating and covering each other. Mark and I were filling in each others gaps of fire.

I thought my magazine was nearing empty and while Mark was firing I took the time to do a tactical reload on my rifle and get my bearing. I looked to my rear and the opposite side of the road and it was all clear. I looked on the overpass and it was all clear. I looked at car number three and I saw Jay Hunt with blood all over his crotch. I heard him tell Johno *I’m hit in the femoral buddy.* very calmly. He slid himself toward the front of the car so that Johno could apply first aid from behind the engine which was the safest spot. I looked at Chris. He was still in the driver’s seat slumped lifelessly to the left against the door.

I checked car two, the armored Mercedes, Simon and Ian were uninjured and now in the fight. I was glad to see them. Although Simon got out with an MP-5 and he quickly discarded it with for an M-4. I was glad to see that as well. I looked at car one and saw Stef was out of the car but he was going down. Although I knew he told me he was hit he had still been in the fight and got out of the car under his own power. I did not realize the extent of his injuries.

I began speaking to Simon who was the closest to me. The next phase of our S.O.P. was, if the cars were down, to commandeer a vehicle from the opposite side of the road, load the dead and wounded, and escape. I asked Simon, who was the closest to me, if he wanted to help me get a couple of cars. He was drawn back into the chaos in front of him and never responded. I yelled *WHO ARE WE SHOOTING AT!?!* as loud as I could to nobody in particular and got no reply.

Ian and Simon were now communicating with Mark. Mark has asked them to move the armored car, vehicle two, up for cover so he can attend to Stef’s injuries. Ian at some point here ran to vehicle one and began covering Mark. Simon tried to move vehicle two but it barely limped forward. It was not moved into a position to cover Mark and Stef. Simon got out and moved up to vehicle one and provided cover for Mark. Since I was not actively shooting at the terrorists I was still searching the areas the guys are NOT shooting at so we have full 360 degree security.

I now know that Mark has assistance and if Simon and Ian cannot help him that there is certainly nothing I can do for him. I shift my attention to Johno who is alone at vehicle three. He is now working on Jay’s injuries frantically and calling for help. I run to him. When I get there I can tell Johno is trying to cover his 360 and work on Jay at the same time. Jay was still breathing but his respirations were becoming labored. I reassured Johno that I had him protected as I scanned the area. After a few moments a car drove toward us from the rear. I waive them off but they do not stop. I fired twice and they stopped.

Johno tells me he is out of bandages. I motion toward my medical pouch and he grabs one of mine. He didn’t realize it, and I didn’t think to tell him, but I had a packet of TraumaDEX in the pouch as well. I could hear the Humvees driving up from the BIAP end of the road (the direction we were traveling) and the Soldiers talking to the others. I was relieved to finally know we had help. Johno and the medic asked for help removing Jay’s Paraclete Releasable Assault Vest. I reach over and yank the ripcord off and the vest fell off allowing the ready access.

Almost simultaneously I see a man walking toward us from the opposite direction. He is white and dressed like a PSD operator although he was wearing no armor and carried no weapon. I find out later he works for U.K. based Olive Security. I yell to him *DO YOU HAVE ANY BANDAGES!?!* he holds up his finger in a *wait a minute* fashion as he strolls my way. I yell louder *DO YOU HAVE ANY BANDAGES!?!* He replies with what I think was an Australian accent *Can we drive through?* I was stunned, simply stunned, that he had the NERVE to ask to drive through. He was within 20 feet now and I said *DO YOU HAVE ANY ****ING BANDAGES!?!* He ignored me and walked past to one of the just arriving U.S. Soldiers and asked if he could drive through.

The Soldier asked *Do you have an SUV?* The man replied *Yes. Can I drive through?* The Soldier said *Get your SUV up here and put that body in it. (Pointing to Chris)* He replied *But we are in a terrible hurry!* The Soldier said *Do it now.* In a much more pleasant tone than I thought the man deserved. The man began to protest and the Soldier clearly, firmly, and loudly stated *DO YOU HAVE A D.O.D. CARD?!* The man replied *Yes.* The Soldier said *THEN I AM YOUR ON SCENE COMMANDER AND I ORDER YOU TO GET YOUR S.U.V. UP HERE AND LOAD UP THAT BODY…NOW!!!!* He finally complied and meandered back toward his truck obviously put off.

The soldier told me to get Chris’ body from the driver’s seat. Johno and a military medic worked on Jay as I opened the door and caught Chris. He had begun to fall out. It happened very quickly from here but the car, which was an automatic, was still in gear and when I pulled Chris out the car began rolling away toward Jay. If Johno had not reacted quickly Jay would have been crushed by the car. I had to drop Chris’ body and run around the opposite side of the car to get inside. Luckily a soldier on the other side was able to get in and switch it off before it crashed into a Humvee that was backing up to avoid the collision.

Jay and Stef were attended to by military medics and were rushed to the closest medical facility at Camp Victory. Johno and the Olive PSD team loaded Chris’ body in the back of their SUV and followed. The 4 uninjured survivors (Ian, Simon, Mark, and I) got into all three vehicles and drove toward the Camp Victory entrance as commanded by the Military. The armored Mercedes sustained enough damage from the gunfire that it could not move the few hundred yards to the checkpoint. We abandoned it on the roadside.

--------------------------------------------------

Other Details

Everyone that was wounded was wounded by the initial volley of gunfire. Stef and Jay both received wounds to their pelvic / upper thigh region that severed their femoral arteries upon the initial contact. Even though they were injured they stayed in the fight. I am unable to assess how many rounds Jay actually fired but it was several. Stef emptied a 30 round magazine (loaded with 28) and reloaded and fired an unknown number of rounds from the second magazine.

I never knew during the firefight which vehicle (or house, or person, etc) was shooting at us and I was the first one in position to deliver accurate, sustained, and deadly return fire and I didn’t know where to aim my gun. I received no serious injuries.

Mark fired with the FN M-249 until it stopped functioning. He estimates he got 60-80 rounds through it first. He switched to his M-4 and fired as well. I am not sure if he ever reloaded the M-4. He received no serious injuries.

Simon was the driver of car number 2 I feel as if he should have been watching the same areas as me and therefore never would have seen the SUV and might not have been told either. He had an MP-5 in his lap but he switched to an M-4 shortly after the gunfire erupted. He never had a target and never fired. He received no serious injuries.
Ian never had to reload his M-4. He received no serious injuries.

Johno emptied a full magazine in his MP-5 and reloaded one time. He was shot through his left buttock and was still providing Jay with care. Johno and I expended all our bandages on our person and from his back pack trauma kit just caring for Jay. Later the doctors at the medical center would say that Mark and Johno did an outstanding job.

Johno was the mission Commander, Ian was second in command, and Stef was third. Nobody was giving any clear commands so in the end I just filled in gaps to the tactical jigsaw puzzle the best I could.

Chris was wounded through the leg first and instead of moving off the *X* he spent the last seconds of his life telling Johno about it while he took another round through his throat and one through his head.

We had two unarmored cars and one armored car. All injuries came from within the unarmored cars. Both of the unarmored cars, while hit multiple times, were never disabled. Although the rounds that impacted the passenger compartment of the armored car did not penetrate, the transmission/engine was destroyed as well as the fuel tank being ruptured.

As soon as our group started shooting the terrorists became disinterested in staying in the fight which is their modus operandi.

There was never a point during the incident where I was affected by any of the mental affects of adrenaline like auditory exclusion or tunnel vision. The reason I point this out is because apparently Olive Security told our team they fired at the SUV. Not only do I not remember seeing or hearing it happening you cannot hear their *7.62* on our video.

I had the least amount of time in the Middle East of anyone on that mission. I have no time in the military; I was a 12 year Cop. My bio is on my website for anyone who wants to read it http://www.TacticalResponse.com

"Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" -John 15:13

There is an AAR separate from this document.

Edited for OPSEC.

 

[Jmann]

Dont know what to think of this

http://patdollard.com/2013/01/state-suspends-gun-carry-permit-for-tn-man-who-made-viral-video/

 

[JWG223]

Wow! Do you really believe this? Its this how you really feel?

Now you feel how I felt when someone tried to play Yeager's promises off the same way.

 

[JWG223]

I used to question your thinking. That's no longer necessary.

If you took my hyperbole serious, then I'm glad that I have more credibility than James Yeager seems to have around here. At least I didn't advocate any violence, thankfully, lol.

 

[CEHollier]

I used to question your thinking. That's no longer necessary.

Man you are way behind.

 

[doc ace]

After reading the arrogance Yeager stated in that AAR made me sick. Claiming that the time it took his brother to say I'm f****cking shot he could have bailed out? What an arrogant prick.

The best first aid is to eliminate the guy shooting at you? Wow. Yes you ultimately want to achieve fire superiority and your rounds can eliminate a threat, dealing with a complex ambush you have to have designated shooters, combat lifesavers etc. Taking 20 seconds to return fire, call distance and direction, and formulate the most direct route to getting to your teammate to STOP THE SEVERE BLEEDING can save lives. I can't believe he was so arrogant about these things... That it actually wasn't his fault his friend got shot in the face and neck soon afterward?

I could care less about this hot rod now. Sorry, my rant is over, I apologize if there are any inconsistencies with his AAR and my dialogue, I'm drinking a Modelo, enjoying the game, and have to read this crap. Have a good night folks.

 

[Leonidas]

If you took my hyperbole serious, then I'm glad that I have more credibility than James Yeager seems to have around here. At least I didn't advocate any violence, thankfully, lol.

I can define hyperbole. So giving you the benefit of the doubt, you have a remarkably naive opinion instead of a stupendously dumb opinion. That changes my evaluation. Don't count Yeager out.

 

[JWG223]

I can define hyperbole. So giving you the benefit of the doubt, you have a remarkably naive opinion instead of a stupendously dumb opinion. That changes my evaluation.

I'm curious, now. You seem to applaud Yeager for his first video "pack your bags", and feel that people like myself who prefer remaining calm and contacting our representatives are niave/stupid/communist, whatever. Have I misunderstood you, or am I reading something incorrect into your attitude?

 

[Leonidas]

My comment had nothing whatsoever to do with Yeager, rather the sentiment that Obama does not wish to disarm us.

 

[JWG223]

My comment had nothing whatsoever to do with Yeager, rather the sentiment that Obama does not wish to disarm us.

I find it amusing that I make a flippant comment that everyone knows is false and people take me at my word, say snide things, etc. and yet Yeager makes a video where he describes killing people, emphasizes that he's serious, and people here say "he's kidding, its cool." I think it proved my point very nicely.

 

[Leonidas]

That makes us even. I think you proved my point, as well.

 

[Request Dust Off]

I find it amusing that I make a flippant comment that everyone knows is false and people take me at my word, say snide things, etc. and yet Yeager makes a video where he describes killing people, emphasizes that he's serious, and people here say "he's kidding, its cool." I think it proved my point very nicely.

FWIW: I never said "he's kidding, it's cool." Nor does everyone else here. A lot of blanket statements get made about the members here and that is not right.

I am just saying it is similar in nature what some others did & there is no backlash that we know of. I am not saying what he is facing or making judgements about his contracting days or his old vs his new image and attitude. I figure that is a separate issue. I am just saying I don't see the need to throw him under a bus. He kind of jumped under the bus. So I guess I am left with not driving back & forth over the guy. I am not sure what he was trying to accomplish. He was some what polarizing before.

JWG, I took some of what you said earlier as joking.

I did appreciate every ones comments so far in this thread.